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effektivitetsgevinsten fra å delta i kvotehandel kan 
være stor nok til å utligne den økonomiske risikoen 
som følger av å påta seg bindende forpliktelser (som 
skyldes at størrelsen på framtidige utslipp er ukjent). 
Vi bruker en dynamisk likevektsmodell for å utføre 
denne analysen. Vi finner at effektivitetsgevinsten som 
utviklingsland kan oppnå ikke nødvendigvis er spesielt 
stor sammenlignet med den risikoen de pådrar seg. 
Utviklingsland kan derfor ha gode grunner til å ikke gå 
inn for en avtale som setter et tak på deres utslipp. 
   
Abstract: This paper explores the costs and benefits 
for all parties to a future climate agreement of 
developing countries taking on binding commitments. 
Such commitments would allow developing countries 
to participate in emissions trading, which has 
significantly lower transaction costs than the present 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Thus we 
analyse whether the efficiency gains obtained by 
participating in emissions trading can offset the 
economic risk (due to the fact that future emissions 
cannot be known) incurred by taking on binding 
commitments. We use a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model to carry out the analysis. We find 
that the efficiency gains that can be obtained by 
developing countries might not be very large 
compared to the risks they incur. Developing countries 
might therefore have good reasons not to embrace 
“cap and trade” emissions trading. 
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1 Introduction 
An important question when discussing a regime for regulating greenhouse gas emissions 
beyond the first Kyoto commitment period is: On what terms would developing countries be 
willing to join a climate agreement with binding commitments to reduce emissions? At 
present, developing countries take part in the climate agreement by being parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM is one of the 
flexibility mechanisms1 and offers Annex B parties (i.e., participating developed countries) 
the opportunity to obtain cheap emission reduction credits. The Annex B country invests in a 
greenhouse gas abatement or sequestration project in a developing country and receives 
emission credits in return that can be used to meet its Kyoto targets. 
The economic gain from getting developing countries to take on binding commitments is 
connected to the gain from replacing the CDM with ordinary (“cap and trade”) emissions 
trading. The CDM is a system for trading emission reductions (or rather credits) instead of 
emission allowances, as with emissions trading. The form of trading used in the CDM is often 
referred to as “credit trading,” and most authors argue that it implies higher transaction costs 
compared to emissions trading. For example, Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002) estimate that 
transaction costs will be $0.652 per ton of carbon-dioxide equivalent (t CO2e) higher for the 
CDM than for the emissions trading mechanism, while in a different study by Michaelowa 
and Jotzo (2003) they find a difference in transaction costs of $0.17/t CO2e. The differences 
between these two studies stem from the differences in the assumptions used. Stavins (1995) 
identifies three components of the transaction costs in a tradable permit market: search for 
information, bargaining and decision, and monitoring and enforcement. The CDM would 
probably involve higher transaction costs in all three components, but this would of course 
depend on the institutional framework chosen for the flexibility mechanisms. In our study we 
will therefore assume higher transaction costs for the CDM than for emissions trading 
(discussed further in section 2). 
Emissions trading would require the developing countries to participate in a climate 
agreement with binding commitments for emissions of climate gases, and hence would permit 
them to trade the allowances obtained from the binding commitments that they have agreed 
to. However, taking on binding commitments might cause developing countries to incur 
higher risks through higher than expected costs of “business-as-usual” (BAU) emissions. 
There is uncertainty regarding developments such as income growth, meaning that a cap 
might become binding in a costly way if, for example, growth rates turn out to be higher than 
expected. If developing countries were to be given a cap that is too low compared to their 
actual BAU emissions, they would risk being worse off under an emissions trading scheme 
than with the CDM. With the CDM this risk is eliminated since it does not rely on setting any 
limit on emissions from developing countries; instead it allows them to sell “abatement” 
projects in which emission reductions are calculated based on a project-specific baseline. 
Hence, in this paper we analyse whether the efficiency gains obtained by participation in 
emissions trading could offset the economic risks that would be incurred by taking on binding 
commitments without knowing what future emissions might be. 
Several other authors have analysed the issue of developing countries participating in a 
climate agreement. The paper by Peck and Teisberg (1999) explores the incentives for 
1 The other two flexibility mechanisms are emissions trading (which is discussed later in the paper) and 
joint implementation – which allows credits from emissions reduction projects to be transferred 
between Annex 1 parties.  
2 All prices are given in US dollars. 
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participating in international CO2-control agreements using tradable emission permits. In their 
model, damages from climate change are included.  They conclude that the Kyoto Protocol 
transfers wealth from the Annex I countries to the non-Annex I countries, but that the 
protocol fails to realize the hoped-for efficiency gains from an agreement to control CO2 
emissions. Their study is based on the CETA model, which is a partial equilibrium model 
focusing on the energy sector and global warming. Two other numerical studies that analyse 
the importance of developing country participation are Zhang (2001) and Manne and Richels 
(1996). Bohm (2002) discusses ways in which the next climate agreement could be made 
more effective by facilitating early participation from developing countries. He focuses on the 
design of the compensation rule, the need to regulate the use of the CDM, the effect of 
allowing borrowing and the implications of a Commitment Period Reserve.   
Our study departs from these earlier studies in some significant ways. We employ a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model, and take into account the transaction costs of 
the CDM. We focus on the possibilities for developing countries to join a post-Kyoto 
agreement with binding commitments, while most other numerical studies of this kind have 
concentrated on the Kyoto agreement itself.  Our model also takes into account the costs (the 
increased economic risk) of replacing the CDM with emissions trading.  
Our study shows that there is a considerable gain to be achieved from getting developing 
countries to join an agreement that includes emissions trading in a second commitment period 
after Kyoto, as compared to the gains that would be obtained through their continued 
participation in the CDM. However, the economic gains for developing countries from 
joining an agreement that includes emissions trading are quite low compared to the economic 
costs of having higher BAU emissions than expected. Developing countries might therefore 
have good reasons not to embrace the cap and trade emissions trading, even if they could do 
so with constraints equal to their expected BAU emissions. We conduct sensitivity analyses 
that confirm the robustness of these findings. 
2 The model 
The DEEP model used in this study is a multi-sectoral, multi-regional, multi-gas dynamic 
CGE model. The production and demand structures are based on the GTAP-EG model 
(Rutherford and Paltsev 2000), with some modifications in the production structure for fossil 
fuels. Non-CO2 emissions are modelled as in the EPPA model (Hyman et al. 2002). The trade 
data used is from the GTAP (v5) database, while the emissions data is from the GTAP/EPA 
Project “Towards an Integrated Data Base for Assessing the Potential for Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation.” The model is fully described in Kallbekken (2003). The growth3 and 
technological change parameters in the model are based on the IPCC SRES A1B scenario 
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000)4. Table 1 lays out the regional aggregation of the model. 
In the model, we assume that the Kyoto Protocol is implemented with emissions trading 
among the Annex B regions. Furthermore, we assume that the protocol is extended for a 
second five-year period, with emission constraints remaining the same for the second 
commitment period.  Each Annex B region is given an endowment of tradable emission 
permits equal to its Kyoto commitment. The emissions trading market is modelled as an 
international trading pool (where all regions initially sell all their permits, before the sectors 
in each region purchase – at a world price – the permits that they need). The Annex B regions 
can bank their permits from the first to the second commitment period. 
                                                     
3 Note that in the model, growth is determined through an exogenous growth rate for consumption.  
4 The SRES A1B scenario assumes “rapid and successful economic development,” whereby the global 
economy grows at an average annual rate of 3%, and whereby technological progress is rapid. 
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Table 1 Regions in the model, region code and full region name. 
 Region code Full region name 
Annex B EU European Union 
 
SEL Permit exporting regions (Former Soviet Union, Eastern and 
Central Europe) 
 RAB Rest of Annex B (Japan, EFTA, Canada, New Zealand) 
(Annex B) USA Kyoto Rejecting Countries (USA and Australia)  
 
CDM regions 
 
BRA Brazil 
 CHN China 
 IND India 
 OPE OPEC countries 
 ROW Rest of World (Asia, Africa, Latin America, Pacific) 
 
CDM credits can be generated by any non-Annex B country (hereafter called CDM 
countries) that undertakes emission reduction projects that reduce emissions below the 
estimated baseline emissions. If we regard the BAU emissions of these countries as the 
baseline, then any reductions in emissions below this level can be regarded as generating 
CDM credits. Conceptually, this is the same as the CDM countries having an emission 
constraint that is exactly equal to their BAU emissions. 
We have chosen to include “carbon leakage” in the BAU emissions. “Carbon leakage” is 
the term used to describe the fact that when one region imposes an emission constraint, this 
will reduce the competitiveness of its emission-intensive industries, and some of the activity 
in these industries will be shifted to regions without such constraints. The reason for including 
carbon leakage emissions is that in the absence of the CDM, these additional emissions would 
actually take place as Annex B countries implement the Kyoto Protocol. Compared to the 
option of excluding carbon leakage, this will give developing countries larger allowances, and 
therefore lower the permit prices in the model.  
The CDM credits are sold to Annex B countries, which use these credits to meet their 
Kyoto commitments. Because it is expected that a credit and baseline system such as the 
CDM would have higher transaction costs than a cap and trade system such as emissions 
trading, we impose transaction costs on these trades in the model; when a CDM credit is sold, 
we impose a tax of $0.50 per ton of Ce (carbon equivalent). This amount is supposed to 
reflect the difference in transaction costs between the CDM and emissions trading, and the 
amount we use lies between the two estimates by Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002 and 2003). 
Introducing a difference in transaction costs would have the effect of increasing the price of 
CDM projects relative to emissions trading, thus reducing the scope for efficiency-enhancing 
trades (and the number of profitable CDM projects).  
In the scenarios where developing countries take part in (cap and trade) emissions trading, 
they do so in the same way as any other Annex B country and without any transaction costs. 
3 Basic scenarios 
3.1 Description of the scenarios 
We begin by running the model for specific scenarios that have different assumptions 
regarding the use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. These scenarios are called no trade, 
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CDM and ET (emissions trading) in reference to the assumptions we make about the period 
following the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (assumed to be the period 2013-
2017). For all these scenarios we assume that the United States and Australia stick to their 
decision not to ratify the protocol.  
In the no trade scenario, the Kyoto Protocol is implemented as intended, with full 
emissions trading between Annex B regions, but the developing countries do not participate 
either through the CDM or ET. Hence they do not carry out any abatement. This scenario is 
introduced as a basis for comparing the CDM and ET scenarios, and also in this section as a 
means to compare our study to other studies. In the CDM scenario, the CDM regions generate 
and sell permits as intended under the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, in the ET scenario, CDM 
regions take part in emissions trading on an equal footing with Annex B regions in the second 
commitment period, with an emission constraint that is equal to their BAU emissions.  
Using scenarios that differ on the basis of the flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol 
is useful in exploring the economics of moving from no trade to CDM to ET. Economic 
theory predicts that when transaction costs are removed, efficiency will increase in the 
emissions trading market, and so might also overall welfare.  
In running the three scenarios in the model, and comparing our results with those of other 
studies, we are primarily interested in the impacts on permit prices and permit trading since 
these elements are the easiest ones to compare between studies. In our discussion we will 
focus on the welfare effects (costs and benefits). 
3.2 Permit prices and estimates in literature 
The results of going from no trade to CDM to ET are not very surprising: The permit price in 
Annex B countries decreases as we move from the no trade to the CDM scenario. More 
specifically, the prices drop from $13.00 to $2.08 (always stated as per ton carbon 
equivalent). When we move from the CDM to the ET scenario, the permit price falls by a 
further $0.20. These results are shown in table 2. 
 
Table 2 Permit prices ($ per ton Ce) and banking* for the different scenarios of 
the use of the flexibility mechanisms 
 No trade CDM ET 
ET price $13.00 $2.08 $1.86 
CDM price $0.61 $1.58 $1.36 
Banking 7.02% 5.69% 4.10% 
 
*Banking is measured in % of total Annex B endowment banked. 
 
If we look at the Annex B countries as a block in the CDM scenario, they meet 7.6% of 
their commitments through purchases of CDM permits in the first commitment period, and 
11.4% in the second commitment period. They also bank 5.7% of their permits to the second 
commitment period.  
Our results are broadly consistent with results from other studies, though towards the lower 
end of the range in terms of permit prices. The IPPC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001) 
provided estimates on marginal abatement costs with global trading for 15 models. The 
marginal abatement costs ranged from $1.40 to $33.00 per ton CO2. Apart from two studies, 
all of these models come up with a marginal abatement cost estimate below $15.00. These 
results depend crucially on a number of assumptions and model characteristics. Most of these 
models do not include gases other than CO2, and this results in a higher permit price. Also, 
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leaving out the CDM increases the price (because fewer cheap abatement options are 
available). 
A particularly relevant comparison is Lucas et al. (2002). The model used in their paper 
includes all six Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gases, the CDM and banking of permits, and it 
also uses the SRES A1B scenario. It is, however, a partial equilibrium model that includes 
market power (we do not include market power in our model, something which would have 
increased the ET permit price). Within this framework they find a permit price of $3.00. This 
set-up is comparable to our CDM scenario price of $2.08.  
The study by Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002) includes the CDM (with transaction costs), but 
CO2 is the only Kyoto Protocol gas that is included. They find an international permit price of 
$3.78. 
3.3 Welfare effects 
As we move from the no trade to the CDM scenario and from the CDM to the ET scenario, 
we expect to see global welfare gains, and this is indeed what our results show. Global 
welfare increases as we move from no trade to CDM and to ET. 5  
The Annex B “permit sellers” region experiences a welfare loss in moving from the no 
trade scenario to CDM and to ET. This is because this region receives significant profits from 
sales of “hot air,” and these profits are hurt when the permit price decreases. All other regions 
gain by moving from no trade to CDM or ET with the exception of Brazil, which experiences 
a small welfare loss in both the CDM and the ET scenarios as compared to the no trade 
scenario. Among the CDM regions, India gains the most from moving towards more 
unrestricted trade (from no trade to CDM, and from CDM to ET), while the “rest of the 
world” (ROW) region experiences very meagre gains. The welfare effects are listed in table 3. 
 
Table 3 Welfare changes (% change in equivalent variation (EV) compared to 
the no trade scenario). 
 CDM ET 
EU +0.046 +0.060 
SEL -0.450 -0.449 
RAB +0.051 +0.065 
USA +0.008 +0.014 
 
BRA -0.019 -0.015 
CHN +0.022 +0.037 
IND +0.095 +0.135 
OPE +0.023 +0.036 
ROW +0.001 +0.013 
Global +0.009 +0.021 
 
 
                                                     
5 Welfare is measured as percent change in equivalent variation for the 20-year duration of the 
scenarios. When we discuss the welfare changes, and do not provide absolute numbers, then changes 
are always measured relative to the no trade scenario. 
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The variation in welfare effects between regions can largely be explained by the different 
economic structures of the regions, and the price changes that accompany changes in the 
permit price. One main effect is that, in our model, permit sellers lose, and buyers gain when 
the permit price decreases. This is the main reason behind the welfare losses that the “Seller” 
region experiences when moving from the no trade to the CDM and to the ET scenario. CDM 
regions experience a welfare gain for two different reasons: As we move from the no trade to 
the CDM scenario, the CDM regions find themselves in a position to sell a number of their 
profitable abatement projects. As we move from the CDM to the ET scenario, the CDM 
regions are able to sell more permits at the same Annex B permit price, as the difference in 
transaction costs (between CDM  and Annex B regions) is removed in the second 
commitment period.  
However, the gains and losses experienced by different countries in the permit market 
cannot fully explain the welfare effects. The changes in permit prices will also influence the 
prices of energy and other goods. In general, the changes in the prices of energy goods and 
other goods are small, typically less than 1% as one moves from no trade to CDM to ET. As 
permit prices decline in Annex B countries, and increase in CDM countries, one would expect 
an increased demand (and hence an increased price) for “dirty” goods, and a decreased 
demand for “clean” goods in Annex B countries, and the opposite in CDM countries. To some 
extent this is what happens: The price of crude oil increases in all Annex B regions, and 
decreases in all CDM regions (where there is any change). The price changes for natural gas, 
which is a relatively clean fuel, are in the opposite direction; the price increases in China, 
OPEC and the ROW region, while it decreases in all Annex B regions. 
4 Uncertainty about BAU 
When developing countries take part in emissions trading instead of the CDM, it produces an 
economic gain. This gain can, in principle, be used in different ways; it can be distributed to 
regions that are reluctant to join the agreement, or to countries that take an economic risk by 
signing the agreement. Global gains amount to $6.2 billion (table 4).6 Developing countries 
receive a little more than half the total gain. The global gains are estimated by comparing the 
welfare in the different scenarios with what we assume would happen if developing countries 
were to choose not to join a climate agreement with binding commitments.  
Table 4 Gain in US$ million from moving from CDM to ET 
EUU 2021 
SEL 12 
RAB 1318 
USA -- 
BRA 122 
CHN 646 
IND 684 
OPE 272 
ROW 1090 
Total 6163 
                                                     
6 These estimates are in line with what one would expect. As a rough estimate of the expected gain 
from replacing CDM with emissions trading for developing countries, we could multiply the reduction 
in the permit price ($0.50), by the total emission endowments of the developing countries (10.3 billion 
tons), and get a value of $5.2 billion.  
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Now assume that developing countries would be willing to join an agreement under which 
they would be at least as well off as they would be if they were to continue the current 
agreement (Kyoto Protocol) with no changes. 
An emissions trading system requires, however, that each country take on binding emission 
constraints. So far we have assumed that caps have no costs for developing countries, as they 
each would be given a cap equal to their respective BAU emissions. In our model we can 
know these emissions with certainty. In reality, if developing countries were to accept a cap, 
there would be uncertainty regarding developments such as income growth, meaning that a 
cap might become binding in a costly way if, for example, growth rates turn out to be higher 
than expected. If developing countries are given a cap that is too low compared to their 
respective actual BAU emissions, they risk being worse off with emissions trading than with 
the CDM. The uncertainty concerning the growth in actual (BAU) emissions would be an 
important consideration in the negotiation of a climate agreement, and could be a reason for 
developing countries to demand more compensation.7  
To examine this question we have considered to what degree the actual emissions of 
developing countries can differ from their estimated BAU emissions before they would 
experience an actual loss (compared to their continuing in a CDM agreement). In our 
calculations, we use the efficiency gains that are obtained to compensate the developing 
countries for the loss incurred by “incorrect” estimates of BAU. The extent to which actual 
emissions can be different from estimated BAU emissions without developing countries 
experiencing a loss is referred to as the “buffer for uncertainty” in BAU emissions.  
We find that developing countries have an average buffer of 4.1%8 (table 5). We also 
consider the case in which, as an added incentive for joining an agreement, the developed 
countries redistribute to developing countries the gains that they obtain from the participation 
of developing countries in emissions trading. With such redistributions, the buffer size 
increases to 9.0% on average. 
 
Table 5 Buffer size (% of emissions) 
Brazil 3.7 
China 2.9 
India 5.3 
OPEC 3.8 
ROW 4.7 
 
Average 4.1 
With all gains 9.0 
 
However, the buffers afforded by the gains are very small compared to what a different 
assumption about growth implies. If we take the SRES A1B scenario as a basis and increase 
the annual growth rate by 1%, this would result in 23.8% higher emissions by developing 
countries in the second commitment period. If we instead reduce the growth rate by 1%, the 
                                                     
7 This would mean that when they negotiate in the first period, they would take into account the option 
value of getting new information in the next period. The option value of new information argument and 
its implications are discussed by Fisher and Hanemann (1986).  
8 That is, they can be given an allowance that is 4% lower than their actual emissions, and still be as 
well off as with the CDM.  
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emissions in the second commitment period would be 16.5% lower for the developing 
countries as a group. This could mean that the compensation available through the efficiency 
gains obtained by developing countries for going from the CDM to emissions trading could 
be too small to sufficiently compensate them for the risk involved in joining an agreement 
with binding commitments9. 
5 Sensitivity analysis 
We have carried out sensitivity analyses for some of the key parameters in the model. First, 
we have run the model with growth rates that are 1% above and below the rates in the SRES 
A1B scenario (reported as grow-less and grow-more). We have run the model with discount 
rates of 3% and 7% (reported as dis3 and dis7), as compared to the rate of 5% used in the 
main scenarios, and we have also tested the effect of assuming different transaction costs – 
$0.10 and $0.80 (reported as trans1 and trans8). Finally, we have tested the effect of changing 
policy assumptions – by letting the United States and Australia take part in the Kyoto 
Protocol in the second period. Tables 6, 7 and 8 summarise some of the results.  
The greatest effects are caused, unsurprisingly, by changing the growth rates. The extent of 
the effects is surprising though (at least initially): When growth is reduced by 1%, the permit 
price in the no trade scenario falls to $1.00. When growth is increased by 1%, the price 
increases to $34.50. The changes in welfare are the result of many different effects. First of 
all, the changes are not merely scale effects; abatement cost curves are exponential and higher 
growth rates will therefore affect abatement costs more than reducing growth by the same 
percentage. See table 6 for details of the welfare effects.  
On average, welfare changes by about twice as much in the grow-more scenario than in the 
grow-less scenario. The size of the buffer for uncertain BAU emissions is as high as 8.8% on 
average (ranging from 5.7 to 10.9% for individual regions) with low growth, and it is reduced 
to as little as 1.1% with higher growth. With all available gains redistributed, the buffer is 
13.1% and 4.6% for grow-less and grow-more, respectively.  
Changing the discount rate has a small effect on permit prices (5% lower and 2% higher for 
the 3% and 7% discount rates in the ET scenario, respectively). The buffer is lower with a 3% 
discount factor and higher with a discount factor of 7% - when we only take the developing 
countries’ gains into account (table 8). The explanation is simply that developing countries 
have smaller gains with which to purchase the extra permits that they would need. If we also 
take into account the gains of going from the CDM to emissions trading for the Annex B 
regions, the opposite is be true; the buffer is higher with a lower discount rate and lower with 
a higher rate. This is because Annex B countries gain more from a lower discount rate than 
developing countries lose by it, and hence the total sum available for buying permits is greater 
– and increases the buffer.  
Changing the transaction costs will, for obvious reasons, change the permit prices. When 
we reduce the transaction costs by $0.40, the ET permit price goes down by $0.13, and when 
we increase the transaction costs by $0.30, the price goes up by $0.11 (table 7). If we look at 
the welfare effects as we move from the CDM to the ET scenario, the changes between the 
analyses are almost perfectly proportional to the ratio of the transaction costs (1 to 5 and 8 to 
5) – with smaller welfare changes coupled to lower transaction costs.  
The buffer is reduced with lower transaction costs and increased with higher transaction 
costs both for the case in which we only take the developing countries gain into account, and 
for the case in which we include all gains. Such a pattern is what we would expect: 
                                                     
9 This would of course depend on developing countries’ attitude to risk and the probability of emissions 
being higher or lower than in our scenarios.  
 
 
8
CICERO Working Paper 2003:09  
 Should developing countries take on binding commitments in a climate agreement?  
 
Lower/higher transaction costs decrease/increase the gain of moving from the CDM to 
emissions trading, and hence the buffer decreases/increases (table 8). 
When we include the United States and Australia in the second commitment period, it is 
not surprising to find that permit prices increase. In the no trade scenario the price is $22.10, 
while it drops to $3.43 in the CDM scenario, and $3.22 in the ET scenario. The welfare of the 
developing countries increases in this policy scenario. However, we also find that the buffer 
for uncertainty in the BAU emissions decreases when the United States joins the climate 
agreement. The reason for this is that the permit price increases, and hence the cost of 
obtaining the extra permits needed to meet the commitments during the second commitment 
period would increase, and the buffer would decrease. The buffer size is 2.6% on average, and 
5.6% if all gains were to be redistributed. 
 
Table 6.A Welfare changes compared to no trade scenario (% change in EV) 
 dis3 dis7 
 CDM ET CDM ET 
EUU +0.095 +0.128 +0.037 +0.045 
SEL -0.278 -0.270 -0.485 -0.487 
RAB +0.103 +0.136 +0.040 +0.048 
USA +0.037 +0.053 +0.000 +0.003 
 
BRA 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.010 
CHN -0.010 -0.002 +0.030 +0.046 
IND +0.004 +0.039 +0.110 +0.149 
OPE -0.018 -0.011 +0.035 +0.049 
ROW -0.032 -0.024 +0.009 +0.021 
 
 
 
Table 6.B Welfare changes compared to no trade scenario (% change in EV) 
 trans1 trans8 
 CDM ET CDM ET 
EUU +0.048 +0.051 +0.045 +0.068 
SEL -0.456 -0.455 -0.445 -0.444 
RAB +0.052 +0.055 +0.050 +0.072 
USA +0.008 +0.010 +0.008 +0.018 
 
BRA -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.012 
CHN +0.025 +0.028 +0.021 +0.045 
IND +0.105 +0.113 +0.088 +0.154 
OPE +0.026 +0.029 +0.021 +0.043 
ROW +0.003 +0.005 -0.001 +0.019 
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Table 6.C Welfare changes compared to no trade scenario (% change in EV) 
 grow-less grow-more US joins 
 CDM* ET CDM ET CDM ET 
EUU 0 +0.005 0.349 +0.380 +0.015 +0.026 
SEL 0 -0.017 -0.451 -0.438 -1.002 -1.004 
RAB 0 +0.004 0.374 +0.402 +0.038 +0.048 
USA 0 +0.002 0.041 +0.050 +0.011 +0.016 
 
BRA 0 +0.003 -0.131 -0.131 +0.021 +0.025 
CHN 0 +0.008 -0.047 -0.045 +0.121 +0.139 
IND 0 +0.022 -0.007 +0.028 +0.343 +0.386 
OPE 0 +0.009 -0.127 -0.123 +0.117 +0.132 
ROW 0 +0.007 -0.176 -0.170 +0.071 +0.084 
* With a permit price less than $0.50 above the CDM price, there is no CDM trading in the grow-less 
scenario, and therefore no differences between the no trade and CDM scenarios.  
 
 
Table 7. Sensitivity analysis: Prices (US$/t Ce) and banking 
 Scenario Emissions trading price CDM price Banking 
No trade $12.93 $0.61 7.34 % 
CDM $1.99 $1.49 5.96 % dis3 
ET $1.77 $1.27 4.28 % 
No trade $12.95 $0.61 6.89 % 
CDM $2.12 $1.62 5.59 % dis7 
ET $1.90 $1.40 4.03 % 
No trade $13.00 $0.61 7.02 % 
CDM $1.77 $1.67 5.64 % trans1 
ET $1.73 $1.63 5.34 % 
No trade $13.00 $0.61 7.02 % 
CDM $2.32 $1.52 5.71 % trans8 
ET $1.97 $1.17 3.10 % 
No trade $1.02 $0.61 5.29 % 
CDM $1.02 $0.61 5.29 % grow-less 
ET $0.66 $0.61 3.95 % 
No trade $34.50 $0.61 8.65 % 
CDM $3.58 $3.08 6.72 % grow-more 
ET $3.34 $2.84 5.56 % 
No trade $22.09 $0.61 7.82 % 
CDM $3.43 $2.93 9.05 % US joins 
ET $3.22 $2.72 8.39 % 
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Table 8 Sensitivity analysis of buffer size (% of emissions) 
  dis3 dis7 trans1 trans8 
grow-
less 
grow-
more 
US 
joins 
Brazil 3.48 3.33 0.81 5.77 8.73 -0.13 2.25 
China 1.48 3.26 0.62 4.48 5.73 1.16 2.03 
India 4.36 5.40 1.13 8.10 10.56 2.00 3.28 
OPEC 1.90 4.15 0.81 5.80 9.29 0.49 2.32 
ROW 3.00 4.92 1.00 7.25 10.86 0.92 2.92 
Average 2.71 4.30 0.87 6.29 8.79 1.13 2.61 
With all gains 11.77 7.46 1.94 13.68 13.05 4.63 5.59 
 
6 Conclusions 
6.1 Main findings 
In this paper we have analysed the costs and benefits obtained when developing countries 
take on binding emission constraints in order to take part in emissions trading in a future 
climate agreement. We have analysed whether or not, and under what circumstances, the 
benefits could be large enough to outweigh the costs. We have shown the following: 
The CDM is assumed to have high transaction costs, and developing countries are assumed 
to have low-cost abatement projects to offer. We find that developing countries could obtain 
substantial welfare improvements by making the transition from the CDM to emissions 
trading.  
Industrialized countries would also obtain welfare gains from this transition, since they 
would get more efficient access to low-cost abatement options in developing countries. These 
gains would increase, both for developing and industrialized countries, if the United States 
were to participate in the climate agreement.  
The welfare gains in developing countries, however, would not be large compared to the 
costs if the emission constraints were to actually become binding. Developing countries might 
therefore have good reasons not to embrace the cap and trade emissions trading, even if they 
could do so with constraints equal to their expected BAU emissions. In fact, we find that the 
incentives to join might not be strong enough even if the industrialized countries were to 
redistribute all or most of their welfare gains to the developing countries as an incentive to 
attract their participation. The participation of the United States in a new Kyoto-like 
agreement in the next commitment period (2013-2017), would have the effect of decreasing 
the buffer available to compensate for the uncertainty in the BAU emissions. 
The sensitivity analyses we conducted confirm this picture. Both the size of the transaction 
costs and the assumptions about the growth rates would influence the size of the available 
buffer. 
6.2 Limitations of the study 
In the approach taken in this paper we look only at the economic gains obtained by moving 
from the CDM to an agreement under which the developing countries participate with binding 
commitments and with emissions trading. Obviously, it is questionable that this would be the 
only approach taken by the developing countries when they take part in negotiating a new 
agreement. From the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol we know that the issue of moral 
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obligations was important to many developing countries. They thought that the developed 
countries should be obliged to reduce their emissions first since they were responsible for 
most of the greenhouse gas emissions up to that time (see for instance Grubb et al 1999). 
Furthermore, the negotiation of climate agreements will take place in a wider policy context. 
For instance, developing countries might be willing to join a climate agreement with binding 
commitments if it were linked to the negotiation of a profitable trade agreement (Carraro and 
Marchiori 2003).  
Moreover, our analysis only takes into account one side of the climate problem, the cost 
side. We have not included an analysis of the benefits of reducing climate gases. Such an 
analysis would show that the willingness of the developing countries to join an agreement 
would be even greater because of their realization that they would likely experience the most 
serious (negative) consequences of climate change. One additional factor, the ancillary 
benefits of reducing climate gases, is not included in our analysis, either. Since emissions of 
greenhouse gases are, to a large extent, connected to the use of energy, reducing them would 
also mean a reduction in the emissions of other polluting gases, such as SO2,  that have local 
effects. Hence, taking ancillary benefits into account would give developing countries a 
stronger incentive to join a new agreement, or alternatively, they would require less 
compensation to do so (Aunan et al 2003 and Aaheim et al 1999). 
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